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A generalized rise in unemployment rates for both college and high-school gradu-
ates, a widening education wage premium, and a sharp increase in college education
participation are characteristic features of the transformations observed in the U.S. la-
bor market between 1970 and 1990. This paper investigates the interactions between
these changes in the labor market and in educational attainment. First, it develops
an equilibrium search and matching model of the labor market where education is
endogenously determined. Other important features of the model are a labor market
which is segmented by education levels, and the imperfect correlation between skill
and education in the labor force. Second, calibrated versions of the model are used to
study quantitatively whether either a skill-biased change in technology or a mismatch
shock can explain the above facts, and to assess the importance of the links between
education and the labor market. The skill-biased shock accounts for a considerable
part of the changes but fails to produce the increase in unemployment for the edu-
cated labor force. The mismatch shock explains instead much of the change in the
four variables, including the wage premium. The endogenous response of education
contributes positively to ﬁt better the model’s predictions to the data on wages and
unemployment, especially so under the mismatch shock.
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11 Introduction
In the U.S., over the period spanning 1970 and 1990, unemployment rates for both high-
school graduates and college graduates nearly doubled, the wage diﬀerential (or premium)
between these two education groups widened considerably, at the same time as the increase
in college participation among high-school graduates accelerated markedly.1 Table 1 reports
ﬁgures on these four variables for the male population in 1970 and 1990.2
Table 1. U.S. labor market 1970-1990
college high-school college
year unemployment rate unemployment rate wage premium participation
1970 1.1 2.4 1.44 0.25
1990 2.1 5.3 1.58 0.33
Is the change experienced by any one variable connected with the changes in the other
variables, or is instead the observed association largely accidental? Do these connections
have signiﬁcant implications for the explanation of the facts and the role of labor-market
policies and institutions? Although the literature dealing separately with wage inequality,
unemployment, and education is signiﬁcant, the relation between the three has not yet
been articulated in an explicit equilibrium framework. This paper takes a ﬁrst step in this
direction.
The ﬁrst objective is to set up a simple theoretical model where the four key labor-
market variables – unemployment rates for college and high-school graduates, wage pre-
mium, and college participation rate – are jointly determined. The second objective is to use
this model to study two alternative factors as candidate explanations of the U.S. changes
documented in Table 1. The two alternative factors considered will be a skill-biased change
in technology and a deterioration of the matching conditions between unemployed workers
and ﬁrms. In previous studies each has been emphasized to analyze a particular subset
of the four variables under study. For example, there seems to be compelling evidence —
1It is well known, though, that the increase in the wage premium was non-monotonic. In the 70’s the
premium actually decreased. This paper will not deal with this particular issue.
2This choice is not completely arbitrary since the two years correspond to the same phase of the cycle in
terms of unemployment. For unemployment and education, the ﬁgures are calculated from the Statistical
Abstracts of the US, US Census Bureau (1995), Tables 662 and 629, respectively. The unemployment rates
refer to male civilian non-institutional population aged 25-64. The college participation of the male labor
force aged 25 and over is the percentage with four or more years of college divided by the percentage with
four or more years of high school. The wage premium is the average wage of college white male workers
over the average wage for high-school white male workers aged 18-64 as reported in Autor et al. (1998).
2such as, for example, Krusell et al. (2000) — of a skill-biased change in technology which
may have driven the rise in wage inequality. The mismatch shock has been considered as
an explanation of rising unemployment associated with more turbulent economic condi-
tions. The unobservable heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ requirements and workers’ characteristics
may have changed in a way that makes it harder for suitable partners to make contact
(see Pissarides (2000,p22-23)).3 The purpose is, ﬁrst, to assess the ability of either hy-
pothesis to explain the complete set of facts and, second, establish to which extent changes
in education are important to rationalize the observed movements in the wage premium
and unemployment rates4. A secondary goal is to draw the implications for residual wage
inequality as a way of further assessing the merit of the two diﬀerent explanations.
To pursue these goals, this paper proposes and analyzes an equilibrium matching-search
model of a labor market that is segmented in two education levels. Workers are diﬀeren-
tiated by innate productive skills and take forward-looking decisions about acquiring edu-
cation and which labor-market segment (or career) to participate in. Firms decide which
education segment to participate in, and which types of workers to hire taking into account
the skill composition of the labor force in the diﬀerent segments. Workers and ﬁrms interact
in this economy in an otherwise standard framework with search and matching frictions to
determine wages and vacancy/unemployment ratios in the two segments.
The analysis has two key features. The ﬁrst is that it considers a labor market which is
segmented. It presupposes that a worker’s education is observable ex-ante and that ﬁrms
post job vacancies that specify the minimal attainment required on prospective candidates
to ﬁlling the post. More speciﬁcally, vacancies in the ’educated’ segment require a degree
and vacancies in the ’non-educated’ segment do not. Segmentation means that both vacant
ﬁrms and unemployed workers conﬁne their search eﬀorts to the one particular segment they
choose, not to both. The second key feature is the assumption that there is an imperfect
correlation between skill and education status. That is, the model recognizes that some of
3Works that study one or more of these factors to explain one or more, but not all, of the variables of
interest are the following. Skill-biased change: Acemoglu (1999), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Saint-
Paul (1996), Caselli (1999), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Shi (2002), Wong (2003). Mismatch: Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998), Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
4Some authors, like Acemoglu (1999), consider that key determinants of college enrollment in the early
70’s were mainly the baby boom and the Vietnam war. The data in Topel (1997, Figure 4) suggests
a strong correspondence between the college/high school wage premium and the enrollment ratio as the
fraction of men 20-24 with some college for the period 1963-95. The present paper sets aside the factors
emphasized by Acemoglu (1999) and focuses instead on the possibilities of an explanation consistent with
Topel (1997)’s ﬁndings.
3the workers in possession of a degree may have a low skill whereas some workers without
a degree may have a high skill. This requires that a person’s skill is subject to important
early inﬂuences other than college education.5 The imperfect correlation skill-education
permits that, by altering the skill composition of the population by education level and
the labor force participating in the diﬀerent segments, endogenous changes in education
and career (or segment) choices may have implications for equilibrium unemployment and
wages across education groups.
Numerical experiments are conducted to study quantitatively the eﬀects in the model of
a skill biased change in technology and a negative shock to the technology of matching. The
benchmark parameters are set to match some long-run observations for the US economy
and the 1970 values of key endogenous variables. The experiments produce steady-state
equilibrium outcomes that are to be compared with the 1990 observations in the data.
The analysis shows that the skill-biased change in technology, while producing a consid-
erable part of the 1970-1990 increase in the wage premium, the non-educated unemployment
rate, and college education, fails to bring about the increase in the educated unemploy-
ment rate. The direct impact of the skill-biased shock itself explains much of the rise in
the wage premium and the non-educated unemployment rate. Nevertheless, the changes
in education have a sizable quantitative impact on the amount of variation in these two
variables, but not in the educated unemployment rate. On the other hand, the mismatch
shock accounts for much of the variation in all the US labor market variables under study,
including the wage premium. In this story, the mismatch shock dominates the increase in
unemployment rates, whereas the rise in the wage premium is largely the result of a change
in the composition of the educated population that improves the relative average skill of
the typical graduated worker. The change in education decisions proves crucial, not only
quantitatively, but also qualitatively, for the mismatch hypothesis to reproduce the facts.
The two theories have also implications for within-group wage inequality. Neither does a
good job at predicting rising residual wage inequality. There is one primitive parameter
tightly related to the distribution of skills in the population which cannot be calibrated
beyond certain boundaries. The main results appear to be fairly, yet not completely, robust
to variation in this parameter.
5Haveman and Wolf (1995), for example, report that achievement is highly correlated with parents’
income and education. Thanks to one of the referees for pointing this out.
4A number of papers have also studied the implications of shocks for the distribution of
wages and unemployment in a search-matching setup. The literature dealing with the wage
premium and unemployment includes Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Acemoglu (1999),
and Saint-Paul (1996). Albrecht and Vroman (2002) add also residual inequality. Hornstein
et al. (2002) focus on residual inequality along with general unemployment. Shi (2002)
and Wong (2003) restrict their attention to the study of the wage premium and residual
inequality. The present paper diﬀers from these works in a number of aspects. First, here
education is endogenized and thus the merit of diﬀerent explanations can be evaluated
against their implications for changes in educational attainment. In the rest of papers,
education changes are either treated parametrically or simply absent. The second diﬀerence
is that those works dealing with the wage premium treat education as equivalent to skill. In
the current paper, the imperfect correlation between education and skill has an important
role and is determined as part of the equilibrium outcomes through the education and career
choices of workers with diﬀerent characteristics. These choices are absent from the papers
cited. Third, and related to the previous point, the present model assumes that the labor
market is segmented in terms of jobs with diﬀerent observable education requirements.
Technically, there is matching function for each segment. This is also a feature of Saint-
Paul (1996). The assumption in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) is similar but, there, a
diﬀerent segment is associated with each diﬀerent productivity-skill level, and outcomes in
each segment are determined independently of changes that aﬀect other segments such as
shifts in the skill composition of the labor force. Shi (2002) has a model of directed search
where the endogenous nature of the matching process leads to segmentation. In Acemoglu
(1999), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), and Wong (2003) there is no segmentation in the
sense of the present paper, so education is not used to sort applicants into job categories
through diﬀerentiated matching processes.6 Finally, the present paper uses data on several
variables to evaluate the implications of changes in both the technology skill-bias and the
matching process. The rest of papers do not analyze the mismatch shock. Changes in
6In the equilibria studied in the present paper, all ﬁrms within any single segment will be of the same
type. This rules out situations with two types of ﬁrms catering for workers with diﬀerent skill level in
the same segment, which is precisely the type of situation that corresponds to a separating equilibrium in
Acemoglu (1999)’s model of a single-segment market. The present paper assumes instead two segments
and only considers pooling equilibria within each segment. This seems consistent with the focus of the
paper on inter-group diﬀerences, whereas the approach in Acemoglu (1999) looks more appropriate to
study within-group diﬀerences. Similar comments carry over to Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Wong
(2003).
5the skill supply and/or the general level of technology not studied in this paper have also
been considered in the other papers. Hornstein et al. (2002) turns its attention instead
to the eﬀects of independently measurable embodied technological change in a model with
an endogenous vintage capital structure. It can be viewed as a noteworthy step towards a
more fundamental identiﬁcation of the ultimate source of the changes under study. Only
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Hornstein et al. (2002), and Wong (2003) share with the
present paper a quantitative approach to evaluating the implications of the theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and ba-
sic behavior relations. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and properties useful for
computation purposes. Section 4 describes the calibration procedure. Section 5 reports
the results of the comparative statics experiments. Section 6 concludes the paper with an
overview of results and ﬁnal remarks.
2 The Model
Agents in the model consist of workers and ﬁrms. Workers can be either acquiring education
or actively participating in the labor market. An active worker’s type is deﬁned by two
characteristics: skill (indexed by j) and education (indexed by i). An active worker can
be skilled (j = s) or non-skilled (j = ns), and educated (i = e) or non-educated (i = ne).
Active workers can be employed or unemployed and searching for a job. Firms can be
either posting one job vacancy and searching or producing output with one worker. A ﬁrm
can be of one of two types i ∈ {e,ne} according to whether it targets educated or non-
educated workers. Workers and ﬁrms that are searching meet through a matching process.
Firms observe the education status of a worker at any time but only observe her skill level
after being matched. This implies that the labor market can be segmented by education
levels. This will be the case here since the focus will be on equilibria with ﬁrms that specify
diﬀerent education requirements when advertising a job. The rest of this section describes
in detail the model and the decision problems faced by workers and ﬁrms, and characterizes
the optimal choices. Attention is restricted to stationary situations with constant decision
rules.
62.1 Workers
There is a continuum of workers who are born with an innate type attribute, l, uniformly
distributed on the interval [0,1]. The type is distributed so that, ordering agents by increas-
ing l, the measure ps at the lower end are skilled or high-ability (i.e. if l < ps, then j = s).
The remaining fraction 1 − ps are non-skilled. Workers may acquire education. Education
has no eﬀect on the skill of a worker. There are two components to the cost of acquiring
education. There is a time requirement, Te, which is the length of the period needed to
become educated, and a component in terms of disutility, ce(l), which is increasing in the
worker’s type l but can take a negative value when education brings positive utility. Thus
skilled workers ﬁnd it less costly (or more rewarding) to get education. Workers face a
constant probability of leaving the labor force, ρ. When a worker leaves, another worker of
exactly the same type replaces her.
The timing of events for a worker is as follows. First, she decides whether to acquire
education. Second, the worker enters the labor force and decides which segment (or career)
of the market, i ∈ {e,ne}, to participate in. A non-educated worker can only search for jobs
in the non-educated segment. This follows because in an equilibrium with segmentation
ﬁrms posting vacancies in the educated segment only consider contacts with workers holding
proof of education. Educated workers can instead search in either segment. Let φi|j ∈ {0,1}
represent the decision of an educated worker with skill j whether to participate (value 1)
or not in segment i so φe|j = 1 − φne|j. Figure 1 is introduced to visualize the type of
conﬁgurations that may arise.
The circle represents the composition of the total labor force in terms of workers’ types.
Given the exogenous distribution of skills, ps, the size of the diﬀerent slices is entirely
determined by the education choices. The bottom and top sections on the circle account for
the skill composition of the educated and non-educated groups of population respectively.
Education and skill are imperfectly correlated when the sections labeled (s,ne) and (ns,e)
do exist. The boxes represent the two market segments and the arrows show the possible
assignments of the labor force of diﬀerent types to the market segments. The career decision,
φi|j, determines the direction of this ﬂow for the educated workers in the two bottom sections
of the circle. Thus education (the slices in the circle) and career decisions (the arrows) will
jointly determine the skill composition of the labor force that participates in each segment,
7pj|i: the proportion of workers in segment i ∈ {e,ne} with skill j ∈ {s,ns}. The skill
composition of the educated population (i.e., the relative size of the two bottom slices of
the circle) and pj|e will coincide only if φe|s = φe|ns = 1. Figure 1 will be repeatedly used













Figure 1. The allocation of workers to segments.
Third, the worker starts searching for a job. Workers and ﬁrms are matched randomly.
The probability that a worker searching in segment i makes contact with a suitable ﬁrm
is νi. The value of being unemployed and searching to a worker with skill j and seeking
employment in segment i is denoted by U(j,i). In a steady-state one can argue that the
Bellman values are not indexed by the worker’s education type since the worker, even if
educated, will never want to exercise the option to switch segment at a later date. Fourth,
upon contact with a ﬁrm the skill of the worker j is disclosed. The unemployed worker
must agree with the vacant ﬁrm on whether to create the job or continue searching. The
decision of the ﬁrm whether to hire the worker is denoted by the indicator πj|i ∈ {0,1},
with value 1 if the decision is positive. If the job is created, the wage to the worker is
w(j,i) and the value of the match is W(j,i). The job is terminated exogeneously with a
Poisson probability λ. In this event, the agent becomes unemployed and searches for a new
job. There is a ﬂow value to the unemployed worker that depends on the wage:
b(w(j,i)) = b0 + b1w(j,i) (1)
The coeﬃcient on the wage can be interpreted as the unemployment beneﬁt replacement
8rate. The ﬁxed component may include the value of leisure.
The worker seeks to maximize the expected present value of utility minus the utility
component of the education cost, ce, and discounts the future at the constant rate r. The
instantaneous utility is given by the value of consumption. Free borrowing and lending is
assumed so that in equilibrium the interest rate equals r and hence the worker maximizes
the present value of wages plus unemployment compensation. With the notation intro-
duced, the Bellman equation for the value of a job to a worker with skill j and matched
with a ﬁrm in segment i is
(r + ρ)W(j,i) = w(j,i) + λ(U(j,i) − W(j,i)). (2)
The value of unemployment for a worker with skill j in segment i is
(r + ρ)U(j,i) = b(w(j,i)) + νiπj|i max{W(j,i) − U(j,i),0} (3)
for i = e,ne and j = s,ns. Concerning career (or segment) choices, for a non-educated
worker the only segment available is i = ne. The choice of segment by an educated worker
with skill j can be represented by




1 U(j,e) − U(j,ne) > 0
0 otherwise
(4)
A worker of type l ∈ [0,1] decides to go to college if
ΓE(l) > 0 (5a)
where, assuming the speciﬁcation
ce(l) = cel − ce, ce > 0, (5b)
ΓE(l) ≡

      
      
e−(r+ρ)Te [φe|sU(s,e) + (1 − φe|s)U(s,ne) − ce(l)]
−U(s,ne) l ∈ [0,ps]
e−(r+ρ)Te [φe|nsU(ns,e) + (1 − φe|ns)U(ns,ne) − ce(l)]
−U(ns,ne) l ∈ (ps,1]
(5c)
9Returning to Figure 1, one can now outline the interactions that in the complete model will
be key to understand the determination of the variables object of this paper: education-
speciﬁc unemployment rates and wages, and educational attainment. The boxes show
that, once the skill composition of the labor force in a particular segment i, pj|i, has been
determined, the hiring policy of ﬁrms πj|i, the wage structure w(j,i), and the probability
of contact for an unemployed worker νi will all be determined within the segment. These
segment-speciﬁc variables will have direct implications for the wages and unemployment
rates across education groups, implications which will be mediated by the skill and career
composition of these groups (determined by ΓE and φe|j respectively). On the other hand,
when deciding whether to educate and which segment to join, a worker compares the returns
to the diﬀerent options which will be largely governed by the segment-speciﬁc variables in
the diﬀerent segments. Shifts in education and career choices have in turn two types of
implications for education-speciﬁc wages and unemployment rates. The ﬁrst is a direct
eﬀect: by altering pj|i and thereby the segment-speciﬁc outputs as just described. The
second is a composition eﬀect: changes in the relative proportion of agents with diﬀerent
skill and career within each education group for given segment-speciﬁc outputs. The rest
of this section lays out the remaining elements of the model that will be used to assess the
role of these interacting mechanisms.
2.2 Firms
The timing of events is as follows. First, an inactive ﬁrm creates a job vacancy that speciﬁes
the education requirement on the worker sought, i (i.e., the market segment). The value of
such a vacancy is V (i). A vacancy is posted and there is contact with a suitable job seeker
with probability ξi. The skill status, j, of the worker met in segment i is not observed by
the ﬁrm at this stage. The ﬁrm holds instead a rational belief about the probability that
a matched worker in that segment has skill of type j. This coincides with the equilibrium
fraction of workers with skill j within the pool of unemployed workers participating in the
market segment i, usj|i. Posting a vacancy has a ﬂow recruiting cost cR.
Second, upon contact, the ﬁrm observes the worker’s skill, and the ﬁrm and the worker
agree on whether to create the job. As before, πj|i ∈ {0,1} denotes the decision by the ﬁrm
of type i whether to hire a worker with skill j.
10Third, the ﬁrm starts operating and the ﬂow of output generated by the ﬁrm is y(j,i).
The value of the existing job match for the ﬁrm is J(j,i). The match terminates as the
consequence of exogeneous job failure which occurs with Poisson probability λ. The job
can also break down by the worker leaving the labor force which occurs at rate ρ. When
the job is terminated, the ﬁrm will seek to open a new vacancy type i of the highest value.
Like the worker, the ﬁrm discounts future values at the constant interest rate r. Formally,
the value of a job of type (j,i) obeys the Bellman equation








and the value of a vacancy of type i satisﬁes
rV (i) = − cR + ξi
X
j=s,ns





0 J(j,i) − V (i) ≤ 0
1 J(j,i) − V (i) > 0
(7b)
2.3 Technology
The ﬂow of output to a match depends on the worker’s productivity. Let ηj denote the
productivity of a worker with skill j and assume that ηs > ηns. The output of a match
involving a worker with skill j equals the value of the gross income ﬂows
ηj = w(j,i) + y(j,i). (8)
The matching technology is segment-speciﬁc. There is a homogenous-of-degree-one
matching function that gives the number of matches per period in segment i, mi = m(vi,ui),
where vi is the mass of vacant ﬁrms and ui is the number of unemployed workers in this
segment. This matching technology is speciﬁed as:
m(v,u) = m0v
1−θu
θ, θ ∈ [0,1],
and m0 > 0 characterizes the eﬃciency of the matching process. Then the probabilities of
11contact that are relevant to ﬁrms and workers are












i(.) < 0 and ν0
i(.) > 0.
2.4 Bargaining, free-entry, and skills of the unemployed
The wage is determined at each instant of time through bargaining over the surplus of a
match between the ﬁrm and the worker that have agreed to create a job. The solution to
the corresponding generalized Nash bargaining problem is
w(j,i) = argmax{β logSW(j,i) + (1 − β)logSF(j,i)},
where SW and SF represent the match surplus to the worker and the ﬁrm respectively, and
β represents the workers’ bargaining power. For the worker SW(j,i) ≡ W(j,i)−U(j,i). For
the ﬁrm, SF(j,i) ≡ J(j,i) − V (i). Using Eq.(1)-(3) and (6)-(7), the necessary ﬁrst-order
condition for this problem is:
1 − β
β(1 − b1)
(W(j,i) − U(j,i)) = J(j,i) − V (i) (10)
There is free-entry in vacancies which leads to the exhaustion of pure rents from vacancy
creation in both segments i ∈ {e,ne}:
V (i) = 0 (11)
The ﬁrms in a segment i take as given the skill composition of the pool of unemployed
workers from which matches are drawn, usj|i. This depends of the skill-composition of
the labor force in this segment, pj|i, and the forces determining unemployment, including
matching and hiring rates, νi and πj|i. Supposing that workers are always willing to accept
the job oﬀers made by ﬁrms, then in a steady-state the equalization of the ﬂows in and out
12of employment will lead to the following expression (see Appendix A):
uss|i = 1 − usns|i = ps|i

νiπs|i + λ + ρ
νiπns|i + λ + ρ




An equilibrium is a situation consistent with Eq.’s(1)-(11) above and, then, also Eq.(12).7
Given the technology described in Eq.(8) and (9), the fundamental endogenous variables in
this system are, for i = e,ne and j = s,ns, the market tightness vi/ui (or, by Eq.(11) the
contact probability νi), wages w(j,i), hiring decisions πj|i, labor participation (or career)
choices φj|i, and the distribution of the value of education ΓE(l) on l ∈ [0,1]. These are
just the variables displayed in Figure 1. As indicated in that ﬁgure, the signiﬁcance of
φj|i and ΓE(l) for the outcomes of any segment i will be conveniently summarized by the
skill-composition of the labor force pj|i in that segment.
The focus of the analysis will be restricted to equilibrium situations where both the
educated and the non-educated labor-market segments are operative8, and where the pro-
portion of skilled workers is higher among the labor force that participates in the educated
segment (i.e., ps|e > ps|ne). The latter is intuitive and convenient since it restricts the
type of career choices that may arise in equilibrium. In eﬀect, the skilled workers that
are educated must decide to participate in the educated segment, or φe|s = 1. Otherwise,
existence of an active educated segment would require the non-skilled educated workers to
be the only participants in the educated segment (see again Figure 1). But then non-skilled
agents would be most numerous in the educated segment, which is inconsistent with the
required condition on the pj|i’s. Thus variation in labor-force participation (or career) will
occur only through the choice by the educated non-skilled workers, for which the shorter
notation φ ≡ φe|ns is introduced.
7The decision of a worker whether to accept an oﬀer in Eq.(3) is dominated by the hiring decision of
the ﬁrm πj|i in Eq.(7) since Eq.(10) must hold. Thus unemployed workers accept equilibrium job oﬀers
made by ﬁrms and Eq.(12) holds.
8In such an equilibrium, the two types of vacancies are optimally created and, given free-entry, ﬁrms
are indiﬀerent between the two types of vacancies given the market tightness and meeting probabilities in
each segment. Therefore in this equilibrium there are no incentives for existing vacancies to deviate from
their segment choice. It is true nonetheless that, in principle, the model could accommodate situations
with a single segment and matching function. For the issues at hand, these situations can be regarded as
being of little interest and are therefore set aside.
13Exogenous skill composition: This section studies ﬁrst the equilibrium in each segment
when the skill composition is exogenous. When the distributions of skills, pj|i, is assumed
to be given, then an equilibrium determines the variables vi/ui (or, by Eq.(11), νi), w(j,i),
and πj|i for i = e,ne and j = s,ns. These are the outputs inside the boxes in Figure 1.
They can be characterized by a number of relations. The derivations are in Appendix A.
One type of relation comes from developing the bargaining condition Eq.(10). This
is a version of the job-destruction curve in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) which gives
the wage as a function of the worker’s skill, the segment’s tightness and the ﬁrm’s hiring










b0 + Ω(vi/ui,πj|i)(ηj − b0)
1 − b1 + Ω(vi/ui,πj|i)b1
(13a)








β(1 − b1)(r + ρ + λ + νi(vi/ui)πj|i)
β(1 − b1)(r + ρ + λ + νi(vi/ui)πj|i) + (r + ρ + λ)(1 − β)
(13b)
Eq.(13) traces out a positive relation between the wage and the equilibrium market tight-
ness. The interpretation is as follows. A higher probability of meeting a vacancy for the
worker, νi, means that the outside option of a job is also higher for the worker. Hence the
wage has to be also higher to keep the worker into the job,. Since νi depends positively of
market tightness, the positive relation between vi/ui and w(j,i) follows.
The other type of relation comes from developing the free-entry condition Eq.(11), using











































14with ω() as deﬁned in Eq.(13) and, using Eq.(12) with (9),
uss|i = 1 − usns|i = ps|i

ν(vi/ui)πs|i + λ + ρ
ν(vi/ui)πns|i + λ + ρ
(1 − ps|i) + ps|i
−1
(14d)
This expression is associated with the idea of job creation. A higher probability of con-
tacting a worker for the ﬁrm, ξi, increases the expected proﬁts for a given allocation of
output between the worker and the ﬁrm. Then free-entry would drive the wages (i.e., the
terms ω(.)) upwards so as to restore the zero value of creating vacancies. Since ξi depends
negatively on market tightness, a negative relation between vi/ui and wages follows for
each j = s,ns. However, by Eq.(13), the wages themselves depend on market tightness,
and the term Ψ(...) in Eq.(14c) picks up this dependence. For each i, the equilibrium can
then be expressed as a market tightness vi/ui that satisﬁes Eq.(14a). It must be consistent
with the ﬁrm’s hiring policy πj|i in Eq. (14b) which characterizes the choice of the ﬁrm
whether to create the job when contacting an unemployed worker with skill j. There is the
possibility that a match with a particular skill j is not proﬁtable and the job is not created,
but observe that (14a) requires that at least for one j the job is created. Changes in the
composition of the labor force ps|i enter this condition through changes in the probabilities
that, say, an unemployed worker is skilled in the educated segment, uss|e, in Eq.(14d).
Since the educated and the non-educated sectors are both operative, any ﬁrm must be
willing to hire at least the skilled workers so that one can set πs|e = πs|ne = 1. In principle,
the non-skilled workers may be hired in either sector, both sectors or none sector. The
following proposition makes this characterization more precise.
Proposition.Assume that pj|i is given. Consider the following conditions:
Ψ(ηs,0,1) > 0 (C1)
Ψ(ηns,0,1) < 0 (C2)
ξ((vi/ui)
∗)ps|iΨ(ηs,(vi/ui)





∗,1) − cR > 0 (C4)
where (vi/ui)∗ is such that Ψ(ηns,(vi/ui)∗,1) = 0 and us∗
s|i is as in Eq.(14d)
with vi/ui = (vi/ui)∗, πs|i = 1, and πns|i = 0. The following holds.
15(a) In equilibrium, πs|i = 1 and the pair (vi/ui,πns|i) is unique.
(b) Assume ps|i ∈ (0,1). Then C1 is a necessary condition for existence. This
condition is also suﬃcient if ps|i = 1.
(c) Assume ps|i ∈ (0,1) and C1. An equilibrium does not exist if and only if
none of conditions C2, C3 and C4 hold. If C2 holds, then the equilibrium
has πns|i = 0. If C3 holds then C4 does not and the equilibrium has πns|i =
1. If C3 does not hold and C4 does, the equilibrium has πns|i = 0.
(d) Assume ps|i = 0. That C2 does not hold is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for existence with πns|i = 1.
The meaning and justiﬁcation of the proposition is best conveyed by using Figure 2. It
represents the left-hand side of Eq.(14a) as a decreasing function of vi/ui, on account of
Eq.(14b)-(14c). Thus an equilibrium must be unique (point a). Also existence requires that
the curve lies above the horizontal zero line for low values of the market tightness. Formally,
given the limiting properties of the function ξ(.), a necessary condition for existence is that
ﬁrms be willing to hire at least skilled workers when tightness is very low (point b).
The left-hand side of Eq.(14a) has a discontinuity at the value (vi/ui)∗ of market tight-
ness where, according to Eq.(14b), πns|i shifts from 1 to 0 or, in other words, the value at
which it is no longer proﬁtable for ﬁrms in segment i to hire non-skilled workers. At this
point, the probability of meeting a skilled worker among the pool of unemployed, uss|i in
Eq.(14d), drops because all the non-skilled workers in this segment become unemployed.
An equilibrium may not exist due to this discontinuity (ﬁrst part of point c). When there
is a zero of the LHS of Eq.(14a) to the right of (vi/ui)∗, non-skilled workers are not hired,
otherwise both skill types are hired (second part of point c). If all the labor force are
non-skilled workers, there is no issue of discontinuity (point d).
This characterization can also be used to derive comparative statics results. For the
purpose of the present paper, it is important to retain that vi/ui and, through Eq.(13),








Endogenous skill composition: The skill composition ps|i has been taken as given so
far. In equilibrium, as indicated by the arrows in Figure 1, it will depend on career and
education decisions of workers. The career choice in equilibrium is determined by Eq.(4),
with the equilibrium values of searching in alternative segments determined by
(r + ρ)U(j,i) = b(w(j,i)) + ν(vi/ui)πj|i
w(j,i) − b(w(j,i))
r + ρ + λ + ν(vi/ui)πj|i
, (15)
where the equality follows from Eq.(2) and (3). Note that the equilibrium condition that the
career choice of skilled educated workers must be to participate in the educated segment
(i.e., φe|s = 1) requires that U(s,e) > U(s,ne). In general, one has to account for the
possibility that two equilibria exist for given education (i.e., ΓE(l)), one with φ = φe|ns = 0
and the other with φ = 1.
Endogenizing education choices will complete the characterization of the equilibrium.
An equilibrium requires that the education decisions satisfy Eq.(5). The assumption in
(5b) implies that the curve ΓE(l) is piece-wise decreasing on the regions of values for l
below and above ps. Therefore the distribution of education over the labor force can be
characterized by two numbers, pe1 ∈ [0,ps] and pe2 ∈ [ps,1], such that l ∈ [0,pe1] ∪ [ps,pe2]









Figure 3. Distribution of types.
Provided that in an equilibrium skilled workers that are educated will decide to par-
ticipate in the educated segment, the distribution of skills within the labor force in each
segment can be written explicitly as follows:
ps|e =
pe1




ps − pe1 + (1 − pe2) + (1 − φ)(pe2 − ps)
(16b)
An equilibrium is a ﬁxed point in the education outcome which can be visualized using
Figure 1 again. A particular ΓE — or, equivalently, (pe1,pe2) — yields equilibrium values for
φ, and through ps|i’s in Eq.(16), the {πj|i,w(j,i),νi}i∈{e,ne},j∈{s,ns}. These values do in turn
aﬀect ΓE and (pe1,pe2). The equilibrium (pe1,pe2) must be consistent with the equilibrium it
generates. By aggregating appropriately the segment-speciﬁc variables, such an equilibrium
delivers implications for educational attainment and education-speciﬁc unemployment rates
and wages. The direct and composition eﬀects discussed at the end of section 2.1 will be
crucial to interpret these implications. Appendices B and C contain details on computation.
4 Calibration
One model’s period is assumed to correspond to one quarter. The number of parameters
to be determined is 15: b1, r, Te, ρ, λ, θ, ps, β, ηs, ηns, b0, cR, m0 and either pe1 and pe2, if
education is exogenous, or ¯ ce and ce, if education is endogenous. The procedure adopted
18here is divided in two steps. First, the parameters are chosen assuming that education is
exogenous. In the second step, the parameters of the education technology, ¯ ce and ce, are
calibrated so that the equilibrium outcomes with endogenous education are consistent with
the values of pe1 and pe2 chosen in the ﬁrst step.
Then 7 of these parameters can be set directly. The choice of b1 is consistent with an
unemployment beneﬁt (UI) replacement rate of 20% from OECD (1997). US Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2002) ﬁnds on March CPS data an average separations rate in 1970 of 25%.
This includes employment-to-unemployment and employment-to-employment transitions.
This is approximately 6% per quarter, the number used for λ in the calibration. A 5%
annual interest rate in Cooley and Prescott (1995) implies a value for r. A life-expectancy
in the labor market of 45 years implies ρ = 1/(45 × 4). The matching elasticity θ is set
following the estimate in Blanchard and Diamond (1990). Four full years required for a
college degree in Autor et al. (1998) determine Te. Since the calibration procedure will
target ﬁgures for unemployment rates, one can argue that the choice of either m0 or cR is
a normalization and can ﬁx m0.
To determine the remaining parameters with exogenous education, outcomes are re-
stricted to be consistent with targets for the key endogenous variables corresponding to
the year 1970. There are two blocks to this task. One block of the calibration procedure
consists of matching the four targets for the wage premium, the unemployment rates of
educated and non-educated workers, and the value of hiring cost as a proportion of wage
income by choice of the four parameters ηs, b0, β, and cR. It is assumed that ηs + ηns = 3,
so ηs determines ηns directly and changes in ηs can be regarded as skill-biased changes in
technology. The targets for the wage premium and unemployment are taken from the 1970
data of Table 1 in Section 1. Concerning hiring costs, Hamermesh (1993) estimated that
average hiring costs represent about 2 per cent of the wage bill.
In the other block, the parameters pe1, pe2, and ps are calibrated to match the targets of
educational attainment and measures of inequality within deﬁned occupational categories
that can be associated with the two segments in the model. The target for education is the
1970 ﬁgure for the proportion of college participation in Table 1. Concerning inequality
within job categories, Gould (2002, Fig. 1b) reports the variance of the OLS log-wage resid-
uals from uniform March CPS data for white males, after controlling for years of schooling,
experience, region of residence, marital status, and living in a standard metropolitan statis-
19tical area. These measures are provided for various years within three diﬀerent occupation
groups: professional sector, service sector, and blue collar sector.9 In the calibration, it
is assumed that the educated segment and the non-educated segment correspond to the
professional sector and the blue-collar sector, respectively. For 1970 the residual variance
of log wages for the professional and blue-collar sectors are 0.18 and 0.12 respectively. The
target to match will be the diﬀerential residual variance of educated over non-educated jobs
in 1970 which is thus 0.06.10 Since only the diﬀerential in residual variance is targeted,
rather than the two absolute values, this block would leave one degree of freedom in the
choice of ps. To deal with this, the model has been calibrated for alternative values of ps
around the target for education 0.25. With a large value such as ps = 0.30 it was found
that the calibration procedure reaches a point where existence fails before meeting all the
targets. With ps = 0.25 the model can be calibrated but then for small increases in ηs an
equilibrium fails to exist which precludes conducting some of the experiments of interest.
For ps below 0.17 the diﬀerence in residual variance across groups is too big to match the
corresponding target. The benchmark calibration features ps = 0.20.11 This choice will be
subject to sensitivity analysis.
Table 2 displays the benchmark calibration with exogenous education and summarizes
the procedure. All targets set out are matched exactly, with the educated and non-educated
residual variances being 0.07 and 0.01.
9The professional sector includes all workers in the professional, technical, managerial, and academic
occupations; the service sector, all service workers as well as clerical and sales workers; the blue collar
sector, all construction workers, craftsmen, machinists, operatives, and laborers.
10Hence there must exist positive residual inequality in the educated segment so the calibrated equilib-
rium must necessarily imply that pe2 > ps and φ = 1. In the model one can calculate the variance within
a segment i as (logws,i − logwns,i)2ps|i(1 − ps|i) where ps|i is the share of skilled in the segment.
11Notice that, since this is smaller than the education target 0.25, then the number of skilled not educated
is less than the number of non-skilled that are educated, or ps − pe1 < pe2 − ps.
20Table 2. Calibration with exogenous education
parameter value target to match source
b1 0.2 UI replacement 20% OECD (1997)
r 0.013 annual interest 5% Cooley et al. (1995)
Te 16 time in college 4 years Autor et al. (1998)
ρ 0.0055 working life 45 years
λ 0.06 annual separation rate 25% Bureau Labor Stat. (2002)
θ 0.5 matching elast. 0.5 Blanchard et al. (1990)
m0 1 normalize to unity
ps 0.20 college partic. 25% Census Bureau (1995)
pe1 0.165 residual ineq. diﬀ. 0.06 Gould (2002)
pe2 0.285
ηs = 3 − ηns 1.915 wage premium 1.44 Autor et al. (1998)
b0 0.775 unemp. educ. 1.1% Census Bureau (1995)
β 0.15 unemp. non-educ. 2.4% Census Bureau (1995)
cR 0.10 hiring costs 2% Hamermesh (1993)
The next step is to calibrate the parameters of the cost of education so that the speciﬁc
values for pe1 and pe2 obtain as the outcome of endogenous education choices. The outcomes
are in Table 3.
Table 3. Calibration with endogenous education
parameter value target to match source
ce 42.1 pe1 Table 2
ce 79.698 pe2 Table 2
5 Numerical Experiments
This section studies separately the equilibrium eﬀects of skill-biased shocks to technology
and shocks to the matching function. The implications of the corresponding shock for
unemployment rates, the wage premium, and educational attainment will be reported and
analyzed. The purpose is to use the implications to assess these sources of shocks as
alternative hypotheses about the causes of US labor market changes between 1970 and
1990. The detailed analysis of the mechanisms at work will highlight the nature and
quantitative importance of the interaction between the key endogenous variables.
215.1 The skill-biased change hypothesis
The skill-biased hypothesis can be represented by a rise in the productivity of the skilled
workers ηs and a corresponding decline in the productivity of the non-skilled workers ηns =
3 − ηs between 1970 and 1990.12 The rest of this section studies the eﬀect of the skill-
biased shock on the calibrated benchmark equilibrium. The ﬁrst column of ﬁgures in Table
4,’Benchmark’, shows the value of the parameter ηs and the endogenous variables in this
benchmark equilibrium. The top portion of the column corresponds to the key observable
variables of interest which take on the values of the 1970 data from Table 1. The second
column reproduces the 1990 data on these same variables for the purpose of comparison
with the implications of the theoretical experiments.
5.1.1 Results for the skill-biased change
In the ﬁrst experiment the education decisions are left to respond endogenously to the
shock. The shift in ηs from 1.915 to 1.965 has been calibrated so that, after the changes,
the model reproduces a wage premium comparable with the value 1.58 observed in the 1990
data. The third column of Table 4, ’Endog. Edu.’, shows this new value for the parameter
as well as the corresponding values for the endogenous variables. One can see that the skill-
biased shock is able to produce rising unemployment for the non-educated and an increase
in the wage premium. Quantitatively, the non-educated unemployment rate after the shock
0.037 falls short of the U.S. 1990 ﬁgure of 0.053, and accounts for near 50 per cent of the
observed increase on the 0.024 rate in 1970. On the other hand, the unemployment rate
for the educated does not undergo any increase, thus failing to reproduce the rise recorded
in the data. Regarding education, the rate of college participation shows a rise from 0.25
to 0.297 which, short of the 0.33 ﬁgure in the 1990 data, accounts for nearly 60 per cent of
the observed increase on the 0.25 rate in the 1970 benchmark.
In order to understand the consequences just reported of the skill-biased shock, one has
to study the associated changes undergone by variables of the model that feature in the
relations depicted in Figure 1. Values for these variables are reported in the bottom portion
of Table 4. The unemployment rate for non-educated workers increases as a consequence of
the decline in a worker’s matching rate in this segment, νne, which follows from the fall in
12Equivalently, one might postulate a widening gap with positive rises in both productivities while the
economy wide parameters increase at an average rate that must exceed the rise in non-skilled productivity.
22tightness in the non-educated segment, vne/une, where all non-educated workers participate.
On its part, it is the increased tightness in the educated segment, ve/ue, that tends to reduce
unemployment for the educated skilled workers, although the quantitative eﬀect is hardly
visible as it stays very close to the benchmark 0.011. Regarding the wage premium, the rise
in the wage of the educated workers that are skilled, w(s,e), tends to increase the average
wage of the educated labor force. There is also a small composition eﬀect at work driven
by the increase in the fraction of high-wage skilled within this group, ps|e, at the expense
of the low-wage non-skilled. On its part, the reduction in the wage of the non-skilled non-
educated workers, w(ns,ne), drives the reduction in the wage of the non-educated group,
eﬀect which is reinforced by the decline in the proportion of high-wage skilled within the
non-educated labor force, ps|ne. Regarding the college decision, a larger number of non-
skilled workers attend college, which is the optimal response to the equilibrium shifts in
the value of the relevant options. As a result of the shock, the value of participating in
education, (r + ρ)U(ns,e), and the value of not participating, (r + ρ)U(ns,ne), both fall.
Because the change in the value of education is discounted (exp(−(r + ρ)Te) ≈ 0.74), the
optimal decisions imply the rise in education participation by the non-skilled, pe2. This
is an opportunity cost mechanism governed by the deterioration of conditions in the labor
market for the non-skilled. For the skilled, the rising return to education, (r + ρ)U(s,e),
along with the decline in the return to not taking education, (r +ρ)U(s,ne), dictates that
college attendance, pe1, goes up.
5.1.2 The role of education under the skill-biased change
The second experiment calculates the equilibrium outcomes for the ηs calibrated in the
ﬁrst experiment while holding the benchmark 1970 education choices constant. The fourth
column, ’Exog. educ.’, of Table 4 shows the result. Both the unemployment rate for the
non-educated and the wage premium still increase, but by smaller amounts than in the
experiment with endogenous education and, therefore, they do not meet the 1990 data
as closely. With exogenous education, the market tightness in the non-educated segment,
vne/une, after the shock is visibly higher than with endogenous education. Thus the direct
eﬀect accounts for much of the contribution of education to the change in the non-educated
unemployment rate. Since wages, w(j,i)’s, are similar whether education is exogenous
23or endogenous, education must have had a predominantly composition eﬀect on the wage
premium. Regarding the educated unemployment rate, with exogenous education it stays
nearly constant and, therefore, provides about as poor a match to the 1990 data as in the
experiment with endogenous education.
Therefore, under the skill-biased hypotheses, the behavior of education contributes to
the quantitative response of the wage premium and non-educated unemployment, but not
to that of unemployment for the educated workers.
Table 4. Skill-biased technical change
’70 Benchmark ’90 Data Endog. educ. Exog. educ.
Exog. parameter ηs 1.915 – 1.965 1.965
unemp. educated 0.011 0.021 0.011 0.011
unemp. non-educ. 0.024 0.053 0.037 0.028
wage premium 1.44 1.58 1.58 1.51
college partic. 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.25
φ 1 1 1
pe1 0.165 0.200 0.165
pe2 0.285 0.297 0.285
ps|e 0.66 0.67 0.66
ps|ne 0.05 0.00 0.05
ve/ue 34.55 36.10 35.42
vne/une 7.36 2.87 5.04
w(s,e) 1.85 1.90 1.90
w(s,ne) 1.78 1.76 1.80
w(ns,e) 1.08 1.03 1.03
w(ns,ne) 1.07 1.02 1.02
(r + ρ)U(s,e) 1.84 1.89
(r + ρ)U(s,ne) 1.77 1.74
(r + ρ)U(ns,e) 1.08 1.03
(r + ρ)U(ns,ne) 1.07 1.02
variance edu. 0.066 0.082 0.083
variance non-edu. 0.011 0.000 0.014
5.2 The mismatch shock hypothesis
The mismatch hypothesis will be represented by a decline in the matching parameter m0
between 1970 and 1990. This section studies the eﬀect of this mismatch shock on the cali-
brated model. The ﬁrst column in Table 5, ’Benchmark’, shows the value of the parameter
m0 and the endogenous variables in the calibrated benchmark equilibrium. The top por-
24tion of the column corresponds to the key observable variables of interest which take on
the values of the 1970 data from Table 1. The second column reproduces the 1990 data
against which the theoretical experiments will be assessed.
5.2.1 Results for the mismatch shock
In the ﬁrst experiment, just as in subsection 5.1.1, education responds endogenously. The
shift in m0 from 1.0 to 0.55 has been calibrated so that the model reproduces an unem-
ployment rate for the non-educated comparable with the 1990 ﬁgure of 0.053. The third
column of Table 5, ’Endog. Edu.’, shows this new value for the parameter as well as the
corresponding values for the endogenous variables. One can see that the mismatch shock is
able to cause rising unemployment for both the educated and the non-educated labor force,
and an increase in the wage premium. Quantitatively, the educated unemployment rate
after the shock, 0.0204, closely matches the U.S. 1990 ﬁgure of 0.021. The wage premium
reaches 1.483, which falls short of the U.S. 1990 value of 1.58, and accounts for about 30
per cent of the observed increase on the 1.44 premium in 1970. Regarding education, the
rate of college participation experiences a rise from 0.25 to 0.297 which, short of the 0.33
ﬁgure in 1990 data, accounts for nearly 60 per cent of the observed increase on the 0.25
rate in the 1970 benchmark.
These results draw on the underlying changes operated in other endogenous variables of
the model. These are reported in the bottom portion of Table 5. The upward shift in the
unemployment rate in the two education groups is driven largely by the drop in matching
rates, νi, that follow from both the direct impact of lower m0 and the downward shift in
market tightness, vi/ui. Given that the wages of non-educated workers, w(j,ne), do not
appear to fall proportionately more than the wages for the educated, w(j,e), much of the
rise in the wage premium must have been caused by the shifts in the composition of the
labor force. The changes in education imply that a larger proportion of educated workers
become high-wage skilled, ps|e, at the same time as the proportion of the non-educated that
are high-wage skilled workers, ps|ne, falls. Regarding the college decisions, a larger number
of non-skilled workers attend college. As a result of the shock, the value of participating
in education, (r + ρ)U(ns,e), and the value of not participating, (r + ρ)U(ns,ne), both
fall. Because the value of education is discounted, the opportunity cost eﬀect leads to the
25rise in education participation by the non-skilled, pe2. For the skilled there is also a decline
in both, the return to education, (r + ρ)U(s,e), and the return to not taking education,
(r+ρ)U(s,ne). Again, discounting means that the fall in the opportunity cost of education
dictates that college attendance by the skilled, pe1, goes up.
5.2.2 The role of education under the mismatch shock
The second experiment calculates the equilibrium outcomes for the m0 calibrated in the
ﬁrst experiment while holding the benchmark 1970 education choices constant. The fourth
column, ’Exog. educ.’, of Table 5 shows the result. The unemployment rate for the non-
educated still increases, but by a smaller amount than in the experiment with endogenous
education and, therefore, does do not meet the 1990 data as closely. With exogenous
education, market tightness in the non-educated segment, vne/une, after the shock is vis-
ibly higher than with endogenous education. Thus the direct eﬀect accounts for much of
the contribution of education to the change in the non-educated unemployment rate. Re-
garding the wage premium, with education held constant it declines relative to the 1970
benchmark and, unlike in the experiment with endogenous education, fails to meet even
the qualitative features of the change in the data to 1990. Since wages, w(j,i)’s, are similar
whether education is exogenous or endogenous, education has had to have a predominantly
composition eﬀect on the wage premium. Concerning the educated unemployment rate, the
change with exogenous education nearly accounts for the shift observed in the data and,
therefore, provides as good a match to the 1990 data as in the experiment with endogenous
education.
Therefore, under the mismatch hypotheses, the behavior of education contributes not
only to the quantitative response of the wage premium and non-educated unemployment,
but also decisively to the qualitative sign of the former.
26Table 5. Mismatch shock
’70 Benchmark ’90 Data Endog. educ. Exog. educ.
Exog. parameter m0 1.00 – 0.55 0.55
unemp. educated 0.011 0.021 0.020 0.021
unemp. non-educ. 0.024 0.053 0.053 0.045
wage premium 1.44 1.58 1.48 1.43
college partic. 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.25
φ 1 1 1
pe1 0.165 0.200 0.165
pe2 0.285 0.296 0.285
ps|e 0.66 0.68 0.66
ps|ne 0.05 0.00 0.05
ve/ue 34.55 32.90 32.23
vne/une 7.36 4.55 6.38
w(s,e) 1.85 1.80 1.80
w(s,ne) 1.78 1.67 1.69
w(ns,e) 1.08 1.07 1.07
w(ns,ne) 1.07 1.05 1.06
(r + ρ)U(s,e) 1.84 1.78
(r + ρ)U(s,ne) 1.77 1.63
(r + ρ)U(ns,e) 1.08 1.07
(r + ρ)U(ns,ne) 1.07 1.05
variance edu. 0.066 0.059 0.060
variance non-edu. 0.011 0.000 0.010
5.3 Residual inequality
Along with a rising wage premium, there has been a substantial widening of wage inequality
within speciﬁed education groups in the U.S. (see Juhn et al.(1993)). This is typically
attributed to variation in unobservable skill attributes. The variance of the log of wages is
a common way of measuring this residual inequality. For the numerical experiments here,
this measure has been calculated within the two education groups and is displayed in the
two ﬁnal rows of Tables 4 and 5.13
In the model, residual inequality within an education group exists when there are both
skilled and unskilled individuals who have the same education attribute. It is useful to break
down changes in wage inequality into two components: the spread in the wage between
skilled and non-skilled wages within the group, and the relative weight of the two skill levels
13See also footnote 10.
27in the group. As expected, the skill-biased shock widens the spread in the two education
groups and leads invariably to increased residual inequality in the educated group. In the
non-educated group, wage inequality declines to zero as only non-skilled workers remain
in this group after the shock. Under the mismatch shock, the spread of wages within the
educated group decreases slightly but the typical shift in composition towards the skilled
worker tends to balance out the eﬀect on inequality. As a result there is a mild decline in
variance within the educated group. On the other hand, the shift in composition of the
non-educated group towards non-skilled workers drives the sharp drop in inequality within
this group as well.
Thus, none of the explanations appears to be apt to account for the documented rising
trend in residual wage inequality in the U.S., especially among the non-educated workers.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
The experiments reported above correspond to a version of the model calibrated for a
particular ps = 0.20. As pointed in Section 4, this choice has been made so that the
equilibrium meets certain requirements of existence under changes in parameters. But this
is not the only possible choice for which these conditions hold. This section repeats the
above experiments for the calibrations corresponding to two more extreme choices of ps,
0.17 and 0.23, around the previous baseline choice of 0.20. For each of the two, the top
row of Table 6 shows the calibrated values for the ﬁxed parameters b0, β, cR, ce, and ce.
The main body of Table 6 contains the values for the parameters ηs and m0 set in the
benchmark (BM) 1970 calibration and the two experiments.14 The rest of entries show the
equilibrium values of endogenous variables across the diﬀerent settings.
With ps = 0.23, the mismatch shock does at least as good a job as in the leading exper-
iment reported in Table 5. In contrast with that, however, now the implied change in the
wage premium is quantitatively comparable with the data, the match of the observed rise in
the educated unemployment rate being more modest though. The increase in educational
attainment is closer to the data in this case too. With a smaller ps = 0.17, however, the
mismatch shock fails to produce the increase in the wage premium as well as in education.
The poor results in these two fronts are related. For such a low ps, the targets on residual
14The remaining parameters are as in Table 2.
28variance and education require a calibration where most of the skilled workers are educated
in 1970 (i.e., pe1 must be 0.16, very close to ps = 0.17). Thus there is little room for a
positive response of education by this group and, therefore, for a quantitatively sizable
decline in the skill contents within the non-educated labor force as it is already a small
0.013 in the 1970 benchmark. Hence the composition eﬀect that drives the rise in the wage
premium in the previous experiments becomes very thin in this case.
The predicted eﬀects of a skill-biased shock under the calibrations for ps equal to 0.17
and 0.23 are similar to those obtained in the leading experiment of Table 4, including the
failure to raise the unemployment rate of the educated labor force. The only apparent
diﬀerence is the quantitative response of college participation, which is larger in the case
with ps = 0.23 and smaller when ps = 0.17.
Further calibrations associated with other intermediate values of the parameter ps have
been considered as well. One can conclude that the results obtained earlier in Section 5.1-
5.3 on the benchmark calibration prove largely robust across these diﬀerent settings. In
particular, the mismatch shock continues to ﬁt the facts well as long as ps is not too small.
Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis
Calibration with ps = 0.23 Calibration with ps = 0.17
b0 = .78,β = .15,cR = .10 b0 = .77,β = .15,cR = .10
ce = 34.8,ce = 65.50 ce = 43.3,ce = 91.62
’70 BM mismatch skill-bias ’70 BM mismatch skill-bias
ηs 1.965 1.965 1.978 1.900 1.900 1.995
m0 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00
unemp. educated 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.023 0.011
unemp. non-educ. 0.024 0.053 0.045 0.024 0.053 0.045
wage premium 1.44 1.59 1.63 1.44 1.43 1.58
college partic. 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.28
φ 1 1 1 1 1 1
pe1 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.17
pe2 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.27 0.28
ps|e 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.63 0.62
ps|ne 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
296 Conclusion and ﬁnal remarks
This paper extends a standard search-matching model by introducing education choices
in a segmented labor market where education and skill are not equivalent attributes of a
worker. The endogeneity of education is one major contribution of this paper to a growing
body of literature which studies wage inequality in related models. Equilibrium properties
of the model are characterized. Then a calibrated setting is used to study a skill-biased
change in technology and a mismatch shock as causes of the changes in education-speciﬁc
unemployment rates, the wage premium, and college education attainment in the U.S.
economy between 1970 and 1990.
A skill-biased change in technology goes part of the way towards explaining the changes
in the wage premium, the college participation rate, and the unemployment rate of non-
educated labor force. However the rise in the unemployment rate of the educated cannot
be accounted for by this shock. The endogenous changes in education decisions make a
positive, albeit limited, contribution to the quantitative eﬀects of this shock. On the other
hand, a mismatch shock explains a great deal of the changes in the wage premium, the
unemployment rates for both the educated and non-educated labor force, and the college
participation rate. The mismatch hypothesis can thus account for the changes in these
four labor market variables. In this case, the change in education is essential to understand
the transformations in the labor market which, in turn, govern the response of education.
Rises in education occur mostly among the already skilled workers, and this brings about
the shifts in the skill composition of the two education groups which are key to explain
the increase in the wage premium. Given the recent emphasis placed on the skill-biased
interpretation of U.S. labor-market transformations, it is remarkable that this paper shows
that a mismatch explanation might work at least as well.
This paper is based on a highly stylized model though. This means that the analysis
leaves as many questions open as it answers. For one thing, the model is not consistent
with the evidence of rising residual inequality under either shock. This not being the focus
of the present paper, points in the direction of necessary further research. In this respect,
there are at least two features of the present analysis that deserve consideration. First, the
quantitative exercises always imply equilibria where educated workers, regardless of their
skills, invariably choose to participate in the segment of jobs that require a degree. This
30precludes the existence of overeducation and its role in wage inequality. Second, by as-
sumption all jobs have exactly the same technology irrespective of the segment they belong
to. Decisions on equipment investment on the part of the ﬁrms would cause heterogeneity
across job types with consequences for wage disparities. Future work will also extend the
approach of this paper in order to explore the ability of diﬀerent hypotheses to explain how
the institutions and policies in European countries may have led to labor-market outcomes
that diﬀer from the US experience. This type of analysis may shed new light on the possible
diﬀerential role of education policies across countries.
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33APPENDICES
A Equations (12), (13), and (14)
Denote by Uj|i the mass of unemployed workers with skill j in segment i. By deﬁnition, the
mass of employed workers with these characteristics is pj|i − Uj|i. The ﬂow equation is ˙ Uj|i =
(pj|i − Uj|i)(λ + ρ) − νiπj|iUj|i. In a steady-state pj|i(λ + ρ) = (νiπj|i + λ + ρ)Uj|i. Then the
deﬁnition of uss|i ≡ Us|i/(Us|i + Uns|i) leads to Eq.(12).
The decision of a worker whether to accept an oﬀer in Eq.(3) is dominated by the hiring
decision of the ﬁrm πj|i in Eq.(7) since Eq.(10) must hold. This permits to remove the max
term in Eq. (3) and simplify the algebra in what follows. Then Eq.(13) results from developing
the surplus-sharing bargaining Eq.(10) using the optimal behavior of ﬁrms (6)-(7) and workers
(2)-(3), and the technology relations (8)-(9), with Eq.(11) to pin down the value of a vacancy in
equilibrium. On the other hand, Eq.(14) comes from the free-entry condition Eq.(11) upon using
the equilibrium ﬁrm’s Bellman equations (6)-(7), the technology relations (8)-(9), and Eq.(13) to
substitute the wage terms w(j,i).
B Computation of Equilibrium
An outline of the main steps involved in the computation follows.
1. Set a pair (pe1,pe2) ∈ [0,ps] × [ps,1].
2. Use Eq.(16) to ﬁnd pj|i’s. This must be done for both φ ∈ {0,1} if the region (ns,e) in
Figure 1 exists, that is if pe2 > ps.
3. Use the Proposition to establish existence and the πns|i’s within each segment. Do so for
each candidate φ, if pertinent.
4. Use Eq.(4) to verify that φe|s = 1 and, if needed, determine existence and value(s) of φ.
This requires computing the equilibrium for given pe1, pe2, and πns|i’s for all the relevant
alternative values of φ.
5. Compute equilibrium outcomes for all surviving candidate φ’s. Update the pair (pe1,pe2)
using Eq.(5) and go back to step 2 until convergence.
In step 3, if ps|i = 1, by the Proposition, πns|i remains indeterminate and must be found through
Eq.(14b) in equilibrium. This is not a problem as the equilibrium can be computed independently
of πns|i in this case. In steps 4 and 5 the equilibrium is computed by solving Eq.(14) using, for
each segment, a Newton-Rapson iteration on market tightness.
C Unemployment rates and wage premium
The calibration and the derivation of results requires computing education-speciﬁc unemployment
rates and wages.
C.1 Unemployment rates
Let Ue denote the mass of educated workers that are unemployed, and Le the size of the educated
labor force. Also let Uj|e denote the mass of workers with skill j within the unemployed pool of
34educated workers. The ﬂow equation is
˙ Ue = (λ + ρ)(Le − Ue) − Us|eνeπs|e
−Uns|e

φνeπns|e + (1 − φ)νneπns|ne

.

















φνeπns|e + (1 − φ)νneπns|ne
.
It remains to calculate the proportions Uj|e/Ue involved. Use the equation ˙ Us|e = (λ + ρ)(pe1 −
Us|e) − Us|eνeπs|e and ˙ Uns|e = (λ + ρ)((pe2 − ps) − Uns|e) − Uns|e

φνeπns|e + (1 − φ)νneπns|ne

. In
a steady-state ˙ Us|e = ˙ Uns|e = 0 so
Us|e =
(λ + ρ)(pe1)
νeπs|e + λ + ρ
,
Uns|e =
(λ + ρ)(pe2 − ps)
φνeπns|e + (1 − φ)νneπns|ne + λ + ρ
.











(pe1)(φνeπns|e + (1 − φ)νneπns|ne + λ + ρ)+
(pe2 − ps)(νeπs|e + λ + ρ)
−1 .
























(ps − pe1)[νneπns|ne + λ + ρ]
(ps − pe1)[νneπns|ne + λ + ρ] + (1 − pe2)(νneπs|ne + λ + ρ)
.
C.2 Wages
For the educated workers, the total wage bill is
˜ we = w(s,e)
pe1




λ + ρ + πs|eνe

+
(φw(ns,e) + (1 − φ)w(ns,ne))
(pe2 − ps)




λ + ρ + φπns|eνe + (1 − φ)πns|neνne

.
and then the average wage for this group is
we = ˜ we

pe1












λ + ρ + φπns|eνe + (1 − φ)πns|neνne
−1
.
35For the non-educated workers
˜ wne = w(s,ne)
ps − pe1













λ + ρ + πns|neνne

And so
wne = ˜ wne

ps − pe1












λ + ρ + πns|neνne
−1
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